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Abstract: Matti Eklund has argued that a new problem in metanormative theory 
arises when we consider the possibility of “normative counterparts”—normative 
concepts with the same normative roles as OUGHT and RIGHT (for instance), but with 
different extensions. I distinguish two versions of the problem, and propose a 
response: when we attend to the commitments involved in the possession and 
application of some normative concepts, we find that the possibility of normative 
counterparts is rationally ruled out. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. “Evil Genius” 
 
The latest epic battle of good and evil comes, thank goodness, to a happy end. The evil 
plans of Evil Genius have been once again uncovered, his henchmen subdued, his diabolical 
Chaos Machine blown to smithereens. Having averted doomsday, our valiant Hero approaches 
her defeated nemesis, searching for adequate words of condemnation.  
“You ought to stop trying to destroy the world,” Hero tells him sternly, after a pause. But 
Evil Genius doesn’t flinch. 
“That’s true,” he grants, holding out his wrists for the handcuffs. “Still, you’ve got to 
admit, I schmought to keep on trying to destroy it, where ‘schmought’ is the action-guiding 
concept we in the criminal mastermind community use. In fact, while we’re playing the blame 
game, you certainly schmought not to have stopped me. That was, as we would say, very 
‘schmrong’ of you.”  
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Hero never comes to regret saving the earth and its inhabitants from vaporization; but, 
long after she has handed Evil Genius over to the authorities, she does catch herself ruminating 
on his defiant rejoinder, and wondering: could he have been correct about what he schmought to 
do? And if he was, is there any way in which she herself, thinking in terms of what he ought to 
do, was more correct, more on the side of reality?  
1.2. “Christmas Bonus” 
Take another case: Hero receives a Christmas bonus. The thing is, though, she doesn’t 
really need the cash to get by, and her sensitive conscience is troubled: ought she to give away 
windfalls like this to people who are really struggling? Then a disturbing thought occurs to her. 
Even if, indeed, she ought to give the money away, might there not be some other, very similar 
standard applying to actions—call it the standard of what she “ought-lite” to do—that’s just a 
little more easy-going, so that it doesn’t include sacrifices like the donation of Christmas 
bonuses? And if so, why would she be so hell-bent on doing what she ought, instead of what she 
ought-lite? Don’t get her wrong: before this, she’d always thought it was very important to do 
what one ought. It’s just, now that there’s another standard for action that’s so similar—you 
ought-lite not kill people needlessly, for instance, or dump contaminants in rivers, and you even 
ought-lite to make charitable donations if you’re richer than Hero is—she doesn’t see much to 
choose between. Still, it’s no small thing to find your normative commitments in flux. Instead of 
feeling liberated to buy the new TV she wants, Hero feels confused.  
1.3. Normative Counterparts and Normative Vertigo 
The similarity between these cases lies in the strange turn each one takes when 
interrupted by what appears to be a certain kind of alternative concept: namely, one that shares a 
“normative role” with one of our normative concepts—it’s used in the same way to guide or 
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evaluate attitudes and actions—while having a different extension. Matti Eklund (2017) labels 
such role-identical, non-coextensive concepts “normative counterparts.” The prospect of these 
concepts, he argues, presents us with a new metanormative problem. As I’ll interpret that 
problem, they seem to pressure us toward what we might think of as “normative vertigo”—a 
disorienting detachment from normative and evaluative facts, which suddenly look weirdly 
insubstantial.1 And sure enough: in both our example cases, an encounter with putative 
normative counterparts leaves Hero feeling that the facts about what one ought to do have been 
somehow deflated. (In the next section I’ll explore the different ways this happens in each case.) 
This paper offers a solution to the problem of normative counterparts: I argue that, for 
some concepts, they don’t exist—or, more cautiously, that we’re rationally required to deny their 
existence. This is because to allow for such a possibility would be to incur rationally 
incompatible attitudinal commitments. If that’s right, I’ll argue below, then Eklund’s problem 
disintegrates under scrutiny. 
 Here’s what’s coming. In section 2 I set out two distinct challenges that normative 
counterparts seem to raise. In section 3, I lay the groundwork for my solution by sketching a 
certain normative concept, calling it OUGHT. (I’ll use small caps to refer to concepts.) Having 
introduced it, I show in section 4 why we have to deny that this concept could have any 
normative counterparts. Finally, section 5 explains the distinctiveness of my approach, and tries 
to dispel worries about it. We find ourselves in strange dialectical territory, when even our 
normative concepts have been called into question, and one might doubt that it can do any good 
to defend them. But I’m optimistic. 
 
 
1 A distinction is often made between normative concepts like OUGHT or RIGHT and evaluative ones like GOOD or 
BEST. I’ll ignore this distinction, however. The problem I’m interested in applies to both sorts of concepts (cf. 
Eklund 2017: 1, n. 1).  
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2. Challenges from Normative Counterparts 
 
2.1. Setup: Plenitude and Parity 
We can set up the problem of normative counterparts in two stages: call them plenitude 
and parity. First, plenitude. Once we allow for normative counterparts at all, there seems to be no 
principled way of keeping them from proliferating. There is, after all, a bottomless supply of 
extensions to build them out of—every combination of possible actions you can imagine. People 
may never have adopted normative concepts that possess those deviant extensions; but it’s hard 
to see why such concepts couldn’t be used. So it looks like we’ll have to think there’s a very 
large number of normative counterparts on the shelves.  
That would mean that, wherever our normative concepts are used, we can be sure that 
there are counterparts pointing in every direction. You hold that the electoral college is an unjust 
institution. You tell your friend she should go vegan. You think The Godfather is the best movie 
of all time. And suppose all that’s right. Still, if you have to allow for indefinitely many 
normative counterparts of UNJUST, SHOULD, and BEST, then other judgments can also be made. 
The electoral college is after all not schmunjust; your friend shouldn’t* go vegan; and the best-
prime movie is actually Casablanca. And here’s the problematic parity between normative 
counterparts: these latter judgments are just as true as yours. The person who makes them is 
getting things right.   
Importantly, this parity between normative counterparts can’t be dissolved by appeal to 
higher-order normative truths. It’s natural, for example, when first confronting the concept BEST-
PRIME, to suspect that it is in some way a bad concept; that we should use trusty old BEST instead. 
And that may be true. Saying so, however, seems only to bring other normative concepts into 
play; and, once we’ve allowed for plenitudinous normative counterparts, we’re vulnerable to a 
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simple iteration of the problem. A lover of Casablanca might cheerfully agree that BEST-PRIME is 
bad; but suppose he also insists that our BEST is BAD-PRIME; we SHOULDN’T-PRIME concern 
ourselves with it. We’ve seen no reason, so far, that this couldn’t be true. And the same thing 
might happen again one level higher, if we compare BAD and BAD-PRIME; and so on. The parity 
between concepts might go “all the way up.” We can begin to explain the problem of normative 
vertigo by saying that such a robust parity between normative counterparts would be an 
uncomfortable one, what McPherson (forthcoming: 3) calls an “alarming symmetry.”  
2.2. The Challenge to Ardent Realism 
Why uncomfortable? Why alarming? It may be useful to distinguish two separate 
challenges that normative counterparts can pose. The first—and the one Eklund gives the most 
attention to—is a challenge to a form of robust metanormative realism, what Eklund calls 
“ardent realism.” Ardent realists are hardcore realists. They resist the minimalistic deflation of 
normative truths that quasi-realists go in for; they see questions about what to do as having some 
really, stoutly objective right answer; they hold that in some way “reality itself favors certain 
ways of valuing and acting” (Eklund 2017: 1). Before Eklund, it might have seemed enough to 
satisfy an ardent realist if she could show that there are bona fide facts (sufficiently explanatory 
ones, maybe2) about what to do—for it to be mind-independently true, say, that Evil Genius 
ought to lead a reformed life of charitable work and gardening. But Hero’s experience in that 
first example case suggests otherwise. Normative counterparts can make us worry that such facts 
aren’t enough to vindicate the ardent realist’s belief in some kind of supreme normative standard.  
The worry isn’t exactly that the existence of normative counterparts like SCHMOUGHT 
would show that normative judgments aren’t objective. No: in the “Evil Genius” case described 
 
2 See Fine (2001: secs. 6–7) and Dreier (2004: sec. 6), who propose to distinguish realists from anti-realists and 
quasi-realists by the role they give to normative properties in certain grounding explanations. 
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it’s objectively and absolutely true that Hero’s nemesis ought to stop plotting mass murder. The 
problem is rather that this objectivity seems deflated—not what ardent realism was after. In fact, 
there are now too many objective truths: for, if we accept Evil Genius’s normative counterpart, 
it’s just as objectively true that he schmought to continue in his wicked ways. If that’s so, then it 
doesn’t seem like Hero’s practical stance is any more aligned with reality’s preferences (so to 
speak) than Evil Genius’s: as far as supervillainy goes, it looks like reality has declined to take a 
position of its own. Thus, without actually contradicting any realist normative claims, normative 
counterparts push us toward a less ardent realm: a realism unsettled by normative vertigo. 
2.3. The Challenge to Normative Resolve 
Even if the fate of ardent realism doesn’t interest you, the alarming symmetry of 
normative counterparts presents a further challenge, one that Eklund doesn’t emphasize: call it 
the challenge to normative resolve. This is what the “Christmas Bonus” case is meant to 
illustrate. There, Hero isn’t directly concerned about whether reality is, as it were, on the side of 
OUGHT rather than OUGHT-LITE. What she’s wondering about is whether to be on the side of 
OUGHT, herself, now that a normative counterpart is on the table. More generally, with such 
alternatives available, one’s commitments to respecting any normative property are in question.  
How so? What’s the worry this time? Well, it isn’t exactly a worry that our normative 
concepts aren’t significant, or that we should act in accordance with different ones (see Eklund 
2017: vii). For the worry wouldn’t be put to rest if we established that our normative concepts 
actually are significant, and are the ones that should guide our actions: that would only trigger a 
higher-order worry about SIGNIFICANT and SHOULD, next to their own normative counterparts. 
But if the objectivity of normative facts seemed deflated, before, in the challenge to ardent 
realism, now even the significance of these facts seems insubstantial and beside the point. If 
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there’s no more to say for OUGHT than that it’s significant, just as it can be said for OUGHT-LITE 
that it’s significant-lite, then a resolute commitment to either concept over the other might seem 
irrational. Or, even if strictly speaking such a commitment doesn’t fall into the extension of 
IRRATIONAL, it nevertheless feels unattractive in some quasi-irrational way. That’s the feeling of 
normative vertigo. 
2.4. Comparison: The Normative Question 
In this second form, especially, Eklund’s problem can helpfully be compared to another 
criticism of normative realism (especially non-naturalism): the charge that it’s unable to answer 
what Christine Korsgaard (1996: ch. 1) called “the Normative Question.” James Dreier’s (2015) 
and Shamik Dasgupta’s (2017) and (2018) press challenges of this variety. They begin by 
granting to the non-naturalist that there’s some sui generis property of the kind she makes 
goodness or rightness or being-a-reason out to be: call it property P (see Dasgupta 2017: 300). 
But they then pose an explanatory challenge: why should we accord special respect to P, over 
other properties, by calling it (say) goodness? Or, why would beliefs about P, instead of about all 
the other properties in the world, rationally require us to be motivated to act in certain ways? The 
non-naturalist realist has fixed on this sui generis feature of things, and she tells us it should 
occupy a central place in deliberation and evaluation—but can she explain what it is about this 
feature that makes it so special? The challenger thinks not: any non-naturalist answer will fail to 
satisfy.  
This problem, like Eklund’s, involves conceding something to the realist, and then raising 
doubts in one way or another about the importance of what has been conceded. A difference 
between the problems, though, should also be observed. Briefly put, Eklund concedes one point 
more than objectors like Dreier and Dasgupta do. They were ready to go as far as supposing that 
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there was something of the kind the realist posited: a non-naturalist property, a “sui generis 
whatnot” (Dasgupta 2017: 301, paraphrasing David Lewis). But if it was also going to be 
maintained that this property ought to be promoted, or rationally required agents to respect it, or 
just was goodness, then they wanted to see some explanation of this. That last point, it seemed to 
them, was more than the non-naturalist could be allowed. But even after that point is conceded, 
it’s still possible to feel the force of Eklund’s problem, which is not an explanatory burden but 
the looming threat of normative counterparts. That threat might still make you queasy, even 
though, as we’ve seen, it’s not easily to formulate the problem precisely. I’ve spoken of it as a 
kind of affliction, even, as “normative vertigo.” There do seem to be philosophical grounds for 
the affliction, however, as this section has tried to bring out. It would be nice to have something 
to say to address it. Well, hang in there. I’m here to help. 
 
3. Normative Roles and the Concept OUGHT 
3.1. The Plausibility of Normative Counterparts 
Take a step back. Why would the existence of normative counterparts seem plausible in 
the first place? Why should we expect that linguistic communities would be able to invent their 
own versions of normative concepts, with different extensions than ours have? One reason is that 
some metanormative views seem to guarantee this possibility (see Eklund 2017: 20–22). Apart 
from that, though, I suppose there just don’t seem to be many hard-and-fast constraints on these 
features of concepts: both extension and normative role look like simple matters of convention.3 
If enough people think of drinking fountains as “bubblers,” then drinking fountains will indeed 
belong to the extension of BUBBLER. Or, if they persistently use a concept to, say, blame 
 
3 [Special acknowledgement] 
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wrongdoers, or bestow honor, their concept will indeed have that function. Just mix and match 
role-conventions with extension-conventions, then (it seems) and you’ll have a straightforward 
method for constructing normative counterparts. That, however, is the picture I’ll be disputing. 
When we pay closer attention, we’ll see that it leads to unacceptable consequences. 
It won’t try demonstrating all our normative concepts are counterpart-free. I’ll be content 
if I can establish the point for one example case: the case of a concept I’ll call OUGHT. If my 
strategy works here, it might work more broadly; and regardless, just a single concept without 
normative counterparts would be enough to break up the conceptual parity that Eklund’s problem 
presented. Indeed, even a possible counterpart-free concept would be enough to answer his 
challenge (see Eklund 2017: 23). Therefore, I feel at liberty to make my consideration of OUGHT 
a little conjectural. I won’t deliberately make things up. I’m proposing what seems to me a 
plausible account of how we use a certain real-life concept. But if you’re skeptical about that, 
consider a more modest position. See if you think it’s at least possible for a concept to work this 
way.  
3.2. The OUGHT-User’s Commitments  
I’ll characterize the concept OUGHT in terms of the conceptual role it plays. And this 
conceptual role, I’ll suppose, can in turn be understood as consisting in the characteristic pattern 
of commitments that competent OUGHT-users undertake—here I’m taking cues from Ralph 
Wedgwood (2007), although the details of our proposals diverge. One of those commitments can 
be represented as follows, where S is an agent and φ is an action: 
(1) The OUGHT-user commits to approving of S’s φ-ing if and only if S ought to φ. 
(The OUGHT-user’s commitment should be read as taking a wide scope over the biconditional.) 
The idea here is that whether or not to approve of an agent’s action won’t be an open question 
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for a competent OUGHT-user, once she judges whether the action is what S ought to do. If that 
attitudinal question is still open for her after that, it only shows she hasn’t quite got the hang of 
the concept.  
A person needs to have the commitment described in (1) in order to count as even 
possessing this concept. Actually deploying the concept will impose new, related 
commitments—most simply, perhaps, when one judges that S ought or ought not to φ. These 
judgments, I posit, involve undertaking commitments according to the following patterns: 
(2) If you affirm that S ought to φ, then you’re committed to approving of S’s φ-ing. 
 
(3) If you deny that S ought to φ, then you’re committed to refraining from approving of 
S’s φ-ing. 
 
Think of these commitments, again, as a matter of settled questions. Once someone has decided 
whether S ought to φ, she won’t still be in doubt about whether to approve of that action; not if 
she’s manifesting competence. That question has already been settled—perhaps as the competent 
user of MAMMAL, when she applies that concept to an object, has already settled the question of 
whether it’s an animal. 
Now, this understanding of OUGHT, as a matter of committing to some non-doxastic 
attitude, might seem to have a non-cognitivist sheen to it—dubious comfort to the ardent realists 
Eklund was goading. However, self-described “robust realists” like Wedgwood and David Enoch 
(2011: 177–84) have adopted it, on the idea that they can still give normative terms suitably 
realist semantic values (see Wedgwood 2007: 106). Since Eklund, too (2017: 40–43; 
forthcoming: 8–9), treats the approach as ardent realism’s best answer to his problem, I won’t 
worry about its realist credentials. And I won’t linger longer, here, to fill out this rough 
conceptual sketch, which I hope is good enough for going on with. I’ll elaborate further only in 
stating two assumptions I make about the kind of question-settling commitments I’ve invoked. 
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First, I’ll assume that the OUGHT-user undertakes these commitments whenever she competently 
applies the concept to actions. They aren’t like conversational implicatures she could evade by 
prefacing her predications with the phrase “strictly speaking,” or by making her judgments only 
privately. Second, I’ll assume that it’s irrational to commit both to approving of an action and to 
refraining from approving of it. I don’t mean for this to be a mere stipulation, though: I’m hoping 
you can already see the ugliness of settling an attitudinal question in both ways at once—not 
very different from the ugliness of believing or intending contraries. 
3.3. Accepting the Concept 
 I’m officially agnostic about whether the concept I’ve just delineated is one we actually 
use, which affords me protection from certain semantic objections. But that doesn’t mean it’s 
beyond criticism in principle. Even if all I’m doing is proposing rules for a brand-new concept, 
there’s still reason to reject it if those rules would get us into trouble. That’s one lesson of A. N. 
Prior’s mischievous logical operator “tonk” (Prior 1960), the introduction and elimination rules 
of which would permit its user to reach any conclusion from any premise. Racial slurs would be 
similarly defective concepts, on the inferentialist analysis Michael Dummett gives them: their 
rules of use license an inference from a person’s racial identity to contemptuous beliefs or other 
pejorative attitudes about that person (Dummett 1973: 454).4 One way of explaining what’s 
wrong with such concepts—following Belnap (1962: 132) and Dummett (1973: 397, 454)—is to 
say that TONK and racial slurs fail to be “conservative.” If we added them to our conceptual 
inventory, we would be adopting rules of inference that convey us to previously unlicensed 
conclusions: to grotesque and vicious errors, in fact. So, we need to be careful what concepts we 
pick up. 
 
4 To be clear, I have nothing staked on Dummett’s analysis being correct, though it does matter that it could describe 
some possible concept. 
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However, my OUGHT isn’t like those concepts. The bare-bones patterns of commitment 
I’ve enumerated for it look simple and conservative: they’re not going to force anyone into new, 
unwelcome approvals and non-approvals they hadn’t counted on. If, in responding to Eklund’s 
problem, I want to use a concept with such rules, I see no reason I can’t. 
 
4. Ruling Out Normative Counterparts 
4.1. The Strategy Here 
Now for the main event: I show why it’s irrational, for any user of the OUGHT I’ve been 
describing, to accept the existence of normative counterparts to that concept. We’re rationally 
required to reject such counterparts, because allowing for them would entangle us in an 
inconsistent set of commitments. This part of the argument comes in two phases. In Phase 1 I’ll 
contend that it would be irrational to judge, of any particular action, that it falls within the 
extension of OUGHT but outside the extension of a normative counterpart. That gets us partway 
there. In Phase 2 I argue for a further conclusion: we are required to make a negative existential 
judgment that there just aren’t any normative counterparts of OUGHT. And if that’s what we 
should think, then we shouldn’t feel threatened by SCHMOUGHT, or OUGHT-LITE, or OUGHT*. We 
shouldn’t so much as believe in them. 
4.2. Phase 1: No Particular Divergences 
 To see why these judgments are rationally required, look at what it would mean for 
someone to fail to make them. Let’s take Hero again as our protagonist, and suppose she rashly 
ignores the advice I’m giving, for some particular action: your adopting a puppy, say. Suppose 
Hero sincerely affirms that this puppy-adoption falls into the extension of OUGHT but not that of 
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some arbitrary normative counterpart OUGHT*.5 If she does this, it amounts to affirming that you 
ought to adopt the puppy, while denying that you ought* to do so. But in doing both those things, 
I’ll now argue, Hero is either manifesting semantic incompetence or making a rational mistake. 
 Recall that normative counterparts, while having different extensions, must have the 
same normative role. (That’s part of what it is to be a normative counterpart.) This means that 
our candidate normative counterpart, OUGHT*, has to function in just the ways I described in 
section 3, when talking about how OUGHT works. If a sincere and competent OUGHT*-user 
affirms that one ought* to φ, she is committed to approving of that φ-ing; and if she denies that 
one ought* to do something, she is committed to refraining from approving of the action.  
 Poor Hero, it follows, has undertaken rationally incompatible commitments. First, by 
adding your puppy-adoption to the extension of OUGHT, she has affirmed that you ought to adopt 
the puppy. From the normative role of OUGHT, we know she has thus committed herself to 
approving of the puppy-adoption—see commitment pattern (2). Second, though, in excluding the 
action from the extension of OUGHT*, she has denied that you ought* to adopt the puppy. Thus, 
in accordance with OUGHT*’s normative role—its version of commitment pattern (3)—she has 
committed herself to refraining from approving of your puppy-adoption. That’s the case, at least, 
if she’s using the concept competently. Now put these two commitments together: Hero has 
committed herself both to approving of your adopting the puppy, and to refraining from 
approving of it. She has settled the question of approving of it both positively and negatively. 
But that’s not okay. As I said above, I’m assuming this combination of commitments is 
irrational.  
 
5 I treat OUGHT as a monadic predicate with an extension composed of actions (all the actions whose subjects ought 
to perform them), but this is only for simplicity, To respect the grammar of the term in English, we’d want to find 
another logical form. See Schroeder (2011) for a roundup of some options, and an argument for thinking of it as a 
relation between agents and actions.  
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 As one way drawing out the irrationality, imagine running the following experiment. You 
sit a volunteer down at a desk with a printed list of possible actions and a pen, and give him these 
two directives: “Put a check mark next to just those actions which you approve of. Also, circle 
just those actions which you approve of.” You leave him to it. Later, when you come back to 
check his work, you find that your action of adopting the puppy has a check mark next to it, but 
isn’t circled. What does this show? Well, your volunteer might just have made a mistake, 
manifesting less than complete competence in following the instructions. But if it’s not that—if 
he really was deliberately, sincerely expressing both approval and non-approval, when he got to 
that item of the list—then something really strange has happened. He has suffered an unusually 
severe rational lapse.6 
 A rational lapse of this sort would be involved in granting that some action falls in the 
extension of OUGHT but not OUGHT* (or vice versa, as it’s easy to see). Contemplating any case 
at all, you’re rationally bound to assign it either to both extensions, or to neither; and this offers 
protection against normative vertigo in particular cases of confrontation, like the sort we see in 
“Evil Genius.” If Hero is right to be sure that her nemesis ought not vaporize the world, then 
she’s also right to be sure that he schmought not vaporize the world. 
4.3. Phase 2: No Normative Counterparts 
Hero may have other worries, though. Maybe she hasn’t found any cases where what 
someone ought to do comes apart from what they ought* to do, but she might wonder all the 
same if those cases are out there. Can we help her shake that nagging thought? Can we show it’s 
rational for her not just to avoid assigning different extensions to OUGHT and OUGHT*, but to 
believe that such role-identical concepts have the same extension? I think we can.7  
 
6 [Special acknowledgement] 
7 [Special acknowledgement] 
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Attend to the biconditional commitment involved in the possession of the concept 
OUGHT: a competent OUGHT-user, says (1), is committed to approving of S’s φ-ing if and only if 
S ought to φ. Since OUGHT* is meant to be a normative counterpart of OUGHT, we have to take it 
that it carries the same biconditional commitment: the competent OUGHT*-user must commit to 
approving of S’s φ-ing if and only if S ought* to φ. We also suppose that Hero is competent with 
both concepts: she understands the normative roles they play, at least implicitly. We can then 
ask: when, if at all, will it be rational for Hero to undertake both the biconditional commitment 
of OUGHT, and that of OUGHT*? And the answer must be: only so long as she regards them as 
coextensive. Thus, she can’t think they’re normative counterparts after all: by definition, 
normative counterparts have different extensions.  
Now, why must this be Hero’s answer? Well, suppose otherwise. Suppose there’s even 
one action—let it be that puppy-adoption of yours, again—such that Hero is agnostic about 
whether it might be sorted into OUGHT’s extension but not OUGHT*’s. As a competent OUGHT-
user, Hero is committed to approving of your adopting the puppy just in case you ought to adopt 
it. As a competent OUGHT*-user, Hero is also committed to approving of adopting the puppy just 
in case you ought* to adopt it. Now, notice that these two conditional commitments will turn out 
to be incompatible, unless the puppy-adoption’s status with respect to OUGHT is the same as its 
status with respect to OUGHT*. But then, if Hero is agnostic about whether these concepts are 
coextensive, then what she’s doing is irrational. Its irrationality is something like the irrationality 
of judging that something is a puma just in case it’s a mountain lion, and judging that it’s a puma 
just in case it’s a cougar, while being agnostic about whether PUMA and COUGAR are coextensive. 
Such a set of conditional commitments would involve, again, a rational failing of uncommon 
magnitude. 
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Another illustrative experiment you can run: Set two lists of actions on the desk in front 
of your volunteer. Gesture to the first, and ask him, “Do you approve of just the actions that 
appear on this list?” If he says yes, gesture to the second list. Ask: “Do you approve of just the 
actions that appear on this list?” If he says yes again—and if he understands what he’s doing—
then either he believes that the lists contain all the same actions, or else he’s haphazardly settling 
attitudinal questions in a way that may well be incompatible. But that, I take it, would be 
irrational.  
4.4. Lessons Learned 
OUGHT* stood for any posited normative counterpart of OUGHT: the conclusions we 
reached with it have broad implications. It doesn’t make sense, we’ve found, to allow that any 
concept sharing OUGHT’s normative role could differ with it in extension: that would make your 
set of conceptual commitments incoherent. And so we’ve arrived at the main point of this paper: 
for the sincere OUGHT-user, toleration for normative counterparts is off limits. To avoid 
attitudinal inconsistency, she must instead reject them whenever they’re proposed—and that 
requirement is good news, I take it, when we come to Eklund’s problem. It means that we should 
never get to the point of feeling the quasi-rational pressure toward normative vertigo that we 
invite if we take on board an endless supply of normative-conceptual options, all structurally on 
par with each other. The normative-conceptual field has been winnowed, the grounds of 
normative vertigo removed. 
One upshot of this argument is that the naïve picture of concepts’ normative roles and 
extensions we started with, in section 3.1, was flawed. Let enough people use a concept for a 
certain purpose, we might have thought, and let them do it with a certain group of referents in 
mind, and they’ll eventually succeed in combining that role and that extension. We’d have to 
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grant this, it might have seemed, even if we ourselves don’t bother using their concept. But that’s 
going too fast. An affirmation that some object is in the extension of a concept isn’t just neutral 
metasemantic record-keeping. It also amounts to a use of the concept, or at least an affirmation 
of its use. Therefore, we need to be circumspect about the doxastic or attitudinal inferences that 
the concept’s use would commit us to: as with TONK and (according to Dummett) racial slurs, so 
also with SCHMOUGHT.  
In a funny way, then, Eklund’s problem and its solution go hand in hand. For the problem 
wasn’t just that we seemed bound to acknowledge lots and lots of concepts, each with a different 
extension. That’s painless enough, on its own. The thing was, all the different concepts Eklund 
was conjuring up were competing for the very place in deliberation or evaluation that our more 
familiar normative concepts held. That is, it was the sameness of normatives role that made 
normative counterparts feel so disturbing. But, I’ve now argued, it’s this very sameness of the 
normative roles, with their patterns of commitment, that protects the alert OUGHT-user from 
vertigo. If she’s being rational, she must judge that her concept has what Eklund calls 
“referential normativity”: its normative role fully determines the extension of any concept 
associated with it (2017: 10). 
   
5. Defending My Metasemantic Approach 
5.1. My Contribution 
In Eklund’s estimation as in mine, a defense of referential normativity—a rejection of 
normative counterparts—is the most promising way of responding his problem. He even points 
to Wedgwood’s conceptual role semantics, which I’ve been riffing on, as a way of securing that 
thesis (Eklund 2017: 40–43). So, he wouldn’t find my form of metasemantic response entirely 
  18 
unexpected. In this paper, though, I’ve done more than just to elaborate Eklund’s own tentative 
suggestion: I’ve offered a more economical solution. It’s true that a Wedgwoodian account of 
normative concepts would guarantee that concepts with the same roles get matched with the 
same extension; but that account also depends on some substantial positions I haven’t needed to 
endorse, myself. For instance, it requires there to be constitutive goals of theoretical and practical 
reasoning (see Wedgwood 2007: 51–52; 100–102), and it rests on a general theory of reference 
determination based on preserving the validity and completeness of a concept’s rules of use 
(Wedgwood 2007: 99; cf. Peacocke 1992: 19).8 My premises and conclusion are compatible with 
these assumptions, but, for my part, I’ve relied only on the ways in which a possible normative 
concept could function. As a result, my answer to Eklund’s problem has remained pleasantly 
lightweight.  
My approach has also offered an insight into the status of referential normativity. It 
shows that this metasemantic thesis isn’t just a desperate tactic for ardent realists on the ropes. 
No, if I’m right, it’s required of everyone—at least, everyone willing to accept the concept I 
sketched in section 3. Just by being an OUGHT-user, I said, one already undertakes a certain set of 
attitudinal commitments; and section 4 argued that these commitments rationally require one to 
deny the existence of normative counterparts. In fact, then, even if you yourself never felt 
particularly disturbed by those alternative concepts—some philosophical constitutions bear them 
more easily than others—you, too, must reject them. Complacency here is irrationality.  
I take that to be a significant finding. The rational requirement that everyone affirm 
referential normativity, for some concepts, is a noteworthy feature of the metanormative 
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landscape, and would be worth pointing out even if it didn’t also help defuse the concerns 
Eklund raised. But, as I’ve argued, it does that too. 
5.2. The Embarrassment of Riches Objection 
There is this further advantage, too, in my approach to Eklund’s problem: it extends 
straightforwardly to address his chief worry about solutions from conceptual roles, the “very 
serious objection” he calls the “embarrassment of riches” (Eklund 2017: 54). Even if concepts 
with the same normative roles must have the same extension, Eklund asks, couldn’t there be 
alternative normative concepts with just slightly different normative roles? (We can call these 
concepts “normative relatives.”) For instance, I’ve understood OUGHT’s normative role in terms 
of commitments governing one’s approval. Could there be a community that instead uses the 
concept OUGHT-ISH, which involves commitments governing the similar attitude “approval-ish”? 
Maybe this is like approval but with slightly shifted boundaries, a different precisification of a 
vague phenomenon. (See Eklund 2017: 56.)  
If normative relatives are possible, nothing will force them to match our concepts in 
extension. One community might truly affirm that S “ought-ish” to φ, while we truly deny that S 
ought to φ. And if perhaps these judgments don’t conflict as obviously as judgments involving 
exact normative counterparts, they still seem ill at ease. Accepting them both would commit us 
to approve-ish-ing of something we don’t approve of. And if approval-ish is enough like 
approval, that looks bad: OUGHT and OUGHT-ISH would appear to be in “normative competition” 
very similar to the kind we saw between normative counterparts (Eklund 2017: 55). This conflict 
might also be repeated at higher orders, just as we imagined with normative counterparts: they 
would then present us with “the same sort of parity problem” we saw before (Eklund 2017: 54), 
and threaten to induce a closely related form of normative vertigo. 
  20 
I can’t show that normative relatives of OUGHT have to be considered coextensive with it. 
We wouldn’t want to conclude that, anyway, without knowing more about the particular role-
variations they involve.  However, the considerations I brought out before do give us reason for 
optimism about this mutation of Eklund’s problem: here, too, we can dare to hope, the problem 
and the solution go hand in hand. For, first, we know it isn’t the sheer plenitude of normative 
relatives that would feel disorienting, but normative competition between them. Challenges to 
ardent realism and normative resolve will only arise when two concepts would seem to commit 
us to rationally incompatible attitudes toward the same actions. But then the solution to the 
problem has the same form as it did for normative counterparts. In some cases, yes, OUGHT will 
prescribe one attitude toward some act, and accepting that a normative relative has a different 
extension would commit us to a rationally incompatible attitude about it—but in those very 
cases, rationality requires us not to assign such deviant extensions. And so the problem dissolves.  
5.3. The Metaphysicians’ Objection 
Stephanie Leary and Tristram McPherson have argued that a metasemantic response to 
Eklund’s problem, such as this defense of referential normativity, would miss the point, at least 
as far as ardent realism goes. (Leave aside the question of normative resolve, for now.) They 
note that the guiding idea of ardent realism—or the featured metaphor, anyway—is that of reality 
itself favoring certain ways of valuing and acting. But then, to them it seems that this is simply a 
matter of there being some real normative properties out there in the world: a matter for 
metaphysics, not metasemantics, to arbitrate. If Evil Genius and Hero, say, are operating with 
different concepts, referring to different properties, then the question we need to ask is just 
“which properties are really normative” (Leary forthcoming: 7). That is, which of them has “that 
sui generis prescriptivity that objectively ‘calls out’ for certain responses in us”? (Leary 
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forthcoming: 11; original italics). And if one of the properties is really, intrinsically normative in 
this way, and the other isn’t, then that should be enough to show that there’s no problematic 
parity between the two, right? If that’s how things are, then “ardent realism appears directly 
secured, independently of referential normativity” (McPherson forthcoming: 13).  
I’ll say this, for such an unruffled metaphysical response: it may be enough to answer the 
problem Dreier and Dasgupta were pressing (see section 2.4). They wanted, you’ll recall, an 
explanation of why some non-natural metaphysical property, some “sui generis whatnot,” would 
deserve the kind of respect we give to reasons or goodness. Leary and McPherson might reply: it 
deserves such respect because it is a normative whatnot; it’s a whatnot possessed of an intrinsic 
prescriptivity, objectively respect-worthy. Of course, that kind of flat-footed answer isn’t likely 
to win the skeptics over. Dreier will likely call it “unacceptably mysterian” (2015: 180); 
Dasgupta may judge it “a pernicious remnant of Scholastic metaphysics” (2017: 312). If you’ll 
grant the metaphysics, though, it seems the ardent realist can resist this objection.  
But on my reading, remember, Eklund’s problem is different precisely in that it isn’t 
disposed of even by such generous suppositions. It’s no surprise, then, that I think the flatfooted 
metaphysical response fails to resolve it. For, imagine we grant what the metaphysicians ask for: 
the property Hero picks out with OUGHT, and not the one Evil Genius picks out with 
SCHMOUGHT, is really normative. McPherson thinks this stipulation would rule out the 
hypothesis of alarming symmetry we were worried about: he thinks it’s the hypothesis that there 
is “nothing that normatively distinguishes” the two properties (McPherson: forthcoming: 13). 
But that isn’t the way I understand Eklund’s problem (see section 2). Rather, the alarming 
symmetry would now manifest in the form of higher-order normative counterparts: we must 
imagine that while there is indeed a normative difference between the two properties, there is 
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also a schnormative difference cutting the opposite way: suppose only SCHMOUGHT, not OUGHT, 
picks out a genuinely schnormative property. It alone has intrinsic schmescriptivity. If that’s how 
things are, it would be strange for the ardent realist to feel vindicated. Eklund’s readers are likely 
to feel light-headed again, for all that the metaphysicians have done to steady them.  
This feeling of normative vertigo would certainly be a mistake, on my view: that’s what 
I’ve been arguing all along. It did need to be argued for, though, if Eklund’s problem was to be 
addressed, and to my mind McPherson and Leary haven’t quite addressed it. The metasemantic 
style of response, on the other hand, seems to scratch the right itch. 
5.4. The SCHMATIONALITY Objection 
Throughout this paper, I’ve talked about what rationality requires of the OUGHT-user. I’ve 
concluded, in the end, that she should deny the existence of normative counterparts. There is a 
reply to this that comes all too naturally, though, once you’ve read your Eklund. “Rationality 
may require the rejection of SCHMOUGHT,” you might find yourself saying; “but what does 
schmationality require? Or, what should* we think of normative counterparts?” I’ve been 
defending OUGHT, my flagship normative concept, from competitors; but I’ve used normative 
language in the process. Does that make me guilty of some sort of question-begging?  
I think not. I have argued that it’s irrational for an OUGHT-user to worry about 
SCHMOUGHT and other normative counterparts. Now, if someone asks her whether it would be 
schmational to worry about them, I recommend she do the same thing as for SCHMOUGHT itself: 
she should reject the concept she’s being handed. At least, it seems up to her challenger to justify 
an expansion of her conceptual repertoire: in her current position, as a RATIONAL-user, 
SCHMATIONAL looks likely to be defective. And it wouldn’t be fair, in response to this move, to 
accuse her of question-begging because of her presumption that RATIONAL matters. That’s what 
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she came into the conversation thinking, after all; and it’s to people with such presumptions that 
Eklund addressed his challenges. If those challenges have been based on concepts she’s (rightly) 
suspicious of, it isn’t her dialectical blunder that vitiates the discussion.   
Maybe there’s a different worry behind the objection, though.9 Even if my argument isn’t 
exactly begging the question, you might wonder who it’s for. Can anyone benefit from it? If 
some reader of Eklund wasn’t bothered by normative counterparts, then this argument will be 
uninteresting to her; and if instead she was knocked off balance by them, won’t she be too 
hesitant about the significance of rationality to follow the line of thought I’ve presented here? 
I answer: that depends on the reader, but I remain hopeful. First, there’s no cause for 
thinking that the only people worried by Eklund’s problem have already ceased to privilege their 
familiar normative concepts. They might persist in normative resolve, even while recognizing a 
new quasi-rational tension in their belief and practice, or while losing some credence in ardent 
realism. The argument I’ve provided might help them resolve such tension or embrace that 
metanormative view. Second, though, I do not abandon to their fate even readers of Eklund with 
more severe cases of normative vertigo: those who have gone so astray that they can no longer 
treat the facts about rational requirement as conclusive verdicts on attitudes or actions. Now, to 
be sure: if their deconversion has been so radical that nothing matters for them any longer, if they 
find themselves with no considered preference for even the most paradigmatically rational 
behavior over the most paradigmatically irrational, then they’re beyond my power to help. May 
God have mercy on their souls. But they may not be like that. It may be that while the label 
“rationality” no longer moves them, they would still welcome some patterns of thought and 
behavior while finding others offensive: they’re not ready to believe contradictions or shrug at 
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global destruction. If there are Eklund-readers like this, then my argument might help to “scare 
them straight.” A little experimentation with putative normative counterparts seemed innocent 
enough to them at first, in their naivete. But now I’m trying to show them the uglier side of their 
new lifestyle: if OUGHT was among the concepts they allowed counterparts for, and if they really 
understood what they were doing, then they were in fact committing a pretty grotesque rational 
error: at a first approximation, the error of both deciding to approve of something and deciding 
not to approve of it. Yikes. It isn’t too late for them, though, even now. With open arms, 
rationality awaits their return.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Imagine that Eklund had mounted a complicated formal argument concluding that 
morality and rationality don’t matter; but imagine this argument hinged on a hard-to-discern 
fallacy, or depended on premises that turned out to contradict each other. Had that been 
discovered, I suspect that worries about normative counterparts would have troubled no one; 
those worries would have been dismissed as unmotivated. If Eklund’s problem looked 
formidable, surely that’s because it didn’t seem to depend on such mistakes. It looked like 
worries about ardent realism and normative resolve could issue from clearheaded philosophical 
pondering. But in fact, I’ve been saying, the mirage of normative counterparts for OUGHT could 
appear only when we have suffered a rational lapse similar to the embrace of contradictory 
beliefs or intentions: it could arise just when we have incurred incompatible attitudinal 
commitments with respect to approving action. If she avoids that kind of error, then, Hero won’t 
be daunted by a vast selection of normative concepts in every size and color. She won’t fear that 
her practical deliberations have been trivially parochial. Add a schm- to any term you want, but 
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she’ll remain unruffled. To her, SCHMOUGHT is just her old friend OUGHT, charmingly 
misspelled.  
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